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CASE NOTES
AGENCY - Master-Servant - Exception to -General
Rule of Master's Non-Liability for Tortious Acts of Serv-
ant Done Outside Scope of Employment. - Plaintiff,
a prior employee of defendant who permissibly remained on
defendant's premises and used employee housing facilities
after termination of employment, was robbed, assaulted, and
severely injured by one Gomez, who had recently been em-
ployed by the defendant. The plaintiff alleged breach of duty
of defendant to adequately police his property, so as to prevent
injuries to persons thereon by any of its employees. Testi-
mony and evidence failed to disclose any prior criminal record
as to Gomez, any wrongdoing by Gomez while in defendant's
employ prior to the assault, or that prior to assault there
was any experience on defendant's farm of assaults or vio-
lence or thefts on the part of employees. The trial court
denied the plaintiff's motion for a new trial and entered
judgment for the defendant. Plaintiff appealed. HELD:
Affirmed. The plaintiff failed to bring his case within the
protection of Pennsylvania law, which subscribes to the view
of Section 317, Restatement of Torts, vhith states that "[a]
master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so as to
control his servant while acting outside the course of em-
ployment as to prevent the servant from intentionally harming
others or from so conducting himself as to create an unrea-
sonable risk of bodily harm to them, if . . . (b) the master
... (ii) knows or should know of the necessity and oppor-
tunity for exercising such control." Teals v. King Farms Co.,
285 F. 2d 62 (3d Cir. 1960).
A universally recognized principle of law is that a master
is civilly liable for injuries and damages to third persons oc-
casioned by the conduct of his servant while acting within
the scope of his employment. Lipman v. "Atlantic Coast Line
R. R., 108 S. C. 151, 93 S. E. 714 (1917) ; Franklin Fire Ins.
Co. v. Bradford, 201 Pa. 32, 50 Atl. 286 (1917). This prin-
ciple, known as the doctrine of respondeat superior, seems to
have been founded on public policy, its purpose being to allo-
cate to business the risks normally attendant thereto. 40 MARQ.
L. REv. 337; MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 359
(4th ed. 1952). It is equally as well established that no recov-
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ery will be allowed against the master where it is ascertained
that the servant's conduct is, in the customary legal phraseolo-
gy, without the scope or course of employment. Ciarmataro v.
Adams, 275 Mass. 521, 176 N. E. 610 (1931); Lamma v.
Charles Stores Co., 201 N. C. 134, 159 S. E. 444 (1931). In-
deed, it has been held that under such circumstances, the
employee in committing a tortious act is deemed to be as
much a stranger to the employer as any third person. Nelson
Business College Co. v. Lloyd, 60 Ohio St. 448, 54 N. E. 471
(1899). It is acknowledged that this rule on non-liability may
be altered by statute, Davenport v. Charleston & W. C. Ry.,
72 S. C. 205, 51 S. E. 677 (1905) ; Ginter v. Pennsylvania R. R.
262 Pa. 474, 105 Atl. 824 (1919), and also that the master
may make himself liable by ratification of the servants' acts.
Cowles v. Johnson, 225 N. Y. 39, 121 N. E. 487 (1918) ; South-
ern Ry. v. Chambers, 126 Ga. 404, 55 S. E. 37 (1906). The
principle of non-liability is also predicated upon public policy,
the presumption being that due to the nature or circumstances
of the tortious act involved, the master has little of the ele-
ment of control inherent in the master-servant relationship.
Wright v. Wilcox, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 343 (1838) ; Gulf v. Reed,
80 Tex. 362, 115 S. W. 1105 (1891). On the other hand, such
an act may be so connected with employment in time and
place as to give the master a special opportunity and a pe-
culiar ability to control the servants' conduct, even beyond
the ambit of activity commonly designated as the scope of
employment. Harper and Kime, The Duty to Control the Con-
duct of Another, 43 YALE L. J. 896 (1934). Early cases
in point applied such a theory in quashing the defense of the
fellow servant rule, where it was shown that there was actual
fault or misconduct attributable to the master, either in the
act of injury or in the selection and employment of the agent
in fault. Rosenatiel v. Pittsburg Ry., 230 Pa. 273, 79 Atl. 556
(1911) ; Frazier v. Pa. R. R., 38 Pa. 104 (1861). These cases
conspicuously involved railways, as did the leading case of
Fletcher v. Baltimore & Potomac R. R., 168 U. S. 135, 42
L. Ed. 411 (1897), which is referred to as having formu-
lated the doctrine applied in the principal case. The Court
imposed liability on the master due to his acquiescence in
previous similar tortious acts of his servant, although outside
the scope of the servant's authority. However, this doctrine
is not confined to railroad companies. Ford v. Grand Union
Co., 268 N. Y. 243, 197 N. E. 2d 419 (1947). In Hogle v.
534 [Vol. 13
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 4 [1961], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol13/iss4/4
CASE NOTES
H. H. Franklin Mfg. Co., 199 N. Y. 388, 92 N. E. 794, 32
L. R. A. (n. s.) 1038 (1910), the rule was applied to a manu-
facturer. Also relatively recent cases have imposed liability
on municipalities where basic aspects of the rule were appli-
cable. McCrink v. City of New York, 296 N. Y. 99, 71 N. E.
2d 419; Stevens v. City of Pittsburg, 129 Pa. Super 5, 194 At].
563 (1937). That the doctrine is not restricted to any par-
ticular type of defendant is evidenced by its formulation into
the Restatement of Torts, § 317 (1934). This section has been
applied by several courts in the past and covers directly the
facts of the principal case. Ford v. Grand Union Co., 268
N. Y. 243, 197 N. E. 266 (1935) ; Dincher v. Great Atl. & Pac.
Tea Co., 356 Pa. 151, 51 A. 2d 710 (1947).
It is submitted that the doctrine of respondeat superior
is an anomaly in the law, and justifiable only on the premise
that there is no other feasible way to equitably distribute
the burden of loss from damages and injuries which are
inherent in the master-servant relationship. However, recog-
nition of the doctrine does not impose absolute liability on
the master, for we have seen that the label "outside the scope
of employment" normally relieves him altogether. That this,
in general, should be true is understandable, for the mere fact
of a master-servant relationship does not destroy the peculiar
personal aspects of the servant's existence. Nevertheless, to
dogmatically assert that an act done outside the scope of
employment can never subject the master to liability is to
add anomaly to the already anomalous. That a master who
knows or should know of the necessity and who has the oppor-
tunity for exercising control over his servants (even though
acting outside the scope of his employment) should be liable
for the consequences of his dereliction, is a proposition of
law which commends itself to the integrity of those most
skilled in the principles of fair and substantial justice.
W=lLAm A. LiTTLE.
CARRIERS - Shipping Act of 1916 - Who is a Common
Carrier By Water? - Prior to 1934 petitioner had been en-
gaged in carrying passengers and freight as a common carrier
in the trade between Ecuador and ports on the Atlantic. In
1934 petitioner installed specially refrigerated compartments,
called "reefers," provided special care, and began carrying
1961]
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bananas for three shippers on a contract basis as a "private
carrier." Between 1946 and 1957, petitioner refused to honor
requests for banana space from other shippers in the trade
because of limited space and prior contractual agreements
reserving the space. In 1957 the other shippers petitioned
the Federal Maritime Board to set aside the contracts under
provisions of the Shipping Act [46 U.S.C.A. 812, 815 (1916) ]
forbidding unjust and unfair discrimination against a shipper
by a common carrier by water. From an order directing peti-
tioner to grant space to the other shippers, petitioner appealed,
contending, contrary to the Board ruling, that it was not a
"common carrier by water" within the meaning of the Act,
46 U.S.C.A. 801 (1916), ["The term 'common carrier by
water' in foreign commerce.., means a common carrier, ex-
cept ferryboats ... , engaged in the transportation by water
of passengers or property .... Provided, that a cargo boat
commonly called an ocean tramp shall not be deemed such a
'common carrier by water in foreign commerce,' "] because it
had not held itself out as a common carrier by water of ba-
nanas. It further contended that because bananas are a com-
modity of a special nature requiring special care and handling,
it might carry bananas on a contract basis as a private carrier.
HELD: The Shipping Act is not confined to those goods as to
which the carrier has held itself out as a common carrier, but
it extends to other goods which such carriers have trans-
ported. Grace Line v. Federal Maritime Bd., 280 F. 2d 790,
(2d Cir. 1960) ; cert. denied, 364 U. S. 933, 5 L. Ed. 2d 365
(1961).
At common law a common carrier is one who holds himself
out to the public as engaged in the business of transporting
goods for compensation for those who may choose to employ
him. 9 Am. JUR. Carriers § 4 (1937) ; Citizen's Bank v. Nan-
tuckett Steamship Co., 5 Fed. Cas. 719 (No. 2730) (D. Mass.
1811). The holding out need not be express but may be implied
from conduct. Fish v. Chapman, 2 Ga. 349, 46 Am. Dec. 393
(1847). Whether one is a common carrier is determined by
the business actually carried on, United States v. California,
297 U. S. 175, 80 L. Ed. 567 (1936) ; Terminal Taxi v. Kutz,
241 U. S. 252, 60 -L. Ed. 984 (1916), or by the obligation as-
sumed, Smitherman v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co., 6 F.
2d 29 (W. D. Ark. 1925). Thus, it is generally held that car-
riers of merchandise by water, seeking general employment,
are to be regarded as common carriers. The Lady Pike, 88
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U. S. (21 Wall) 1, 22 L. Ed. 499 (1874); Propeller Niagara
v. Cordes, 62 U. S. (21 How.) 22, 16 L. Ed. 41 (1859). On the
other hand, a private carrier is one, who, without making it
a vocation or holding himself out to the public as willing-to
carry generally, undertakes by special agreement in a particu-
lar instance to transport property without being bound to
serve every person who may apply. 9 Am. JUR. Carriers § 37
(1937) ; Stones v. Underseth, 85 Mont. 11, 277 Pac. 437
(1929). However, the same person may be engaged in one line
of business as a common carrier and in another line as a
private carrier. Terminal Taxi v. Kutz, supra; Chenery v.
Employees Liab. Assur. Corp., 4 F. 2d 826 (9th Cir. 1925).
But the same facilities cannot be used at the same time in both
common carrier and private carrier transportation. The City
of Dunkirk, 10 F. 2d 609 (S. D. N. Y. 1925) ; Hubert v. Public
Serv. Comm., 118 Pa. Super. 128, 180 Atl. 23 (1935). Al-
though at common law a common carrier may act by special
contract as a private carrier, when acting outside the scope
of its legal duties in carrying something that is not its busi-
ness to carry because of special dangers or extreme values
of the cargo, Express Cases, 117 U. S. 1, 29 L. Ed. 791 (1886) ;
United States v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 221 F. 2d 698
(6th Cir. 1950), a person cannot by executing a contract
change the character of his operation from that of common
carrier to private carrier, Denver & R. G. W. Ry. v. Linck,
56 F. 2d 957 (10th Cir. 1932); Memphis News Pub. Co. v.
Southern R. R., 110 Tenn. 684, 75 S. W. 941 (1903), nor divest
himself of his status by declaring in his bill of lading that
he is not a common carrier. Bank of Ky. v. Adams Express,
93 U. S. 174, 23 L. Ed. 872 (1876). Accordingly, it is generally
held that a carrier by water becomes a private carrier when
the entire ship is chartered to a special person or for a special
reason, the ship then being an ordinary bailee to transport for
hire (so-called "tramp") or private contract carrier. The
Monarch of Nassau, 155 F. 2d 48 (5th Cir. 1946) ; Koppers
Conn. Coke Co. v. James McWilliams Blue Line, 89 F. 2d 865
(2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied 302 U. S. 706, 82 L. Ed. 545
(1937). If any part of the ship is available to the public, al-
though the other portion is taken up by a cargo shipped under
a special charter, the owner is still a common carrier. Gage
v. Tirell, 91 Mass. (9 Allen) 299 (1864). Thus, in accord with
the principle of the instant case in City of Dunkirk, supra, it
was held that a general ship tking cargo at various points
1961]
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could not evade its liability as a common carrier by carrying
a cargo of coconut oil under special contract.
The case is correctly decided. The statute is concerned with
the regulation of carriers, not of carriage. Therefore, it is
not necessary to go any further than to determine whether
petitioner falls within the regulated class of carriers. The
statute recognizes only two classes of carriers by water, the
common carrier and the bailee for hire or "tramp," the latter
being specifically exempted from regulation. At common law
it is clear that a ship carrying goods generally in the trade
is a common carrier by water of all the goods it transports.
If the ship carries the goods, no further holding out is neces-
sary; the law will imply it. Moreover, at common law only
a bailee for hire or "tramp" could become a private carrier
with the privilege of contract carriage. To become such a
carrier, it was necessary that the entire ship be chartered out;
no part of the vessel could be retained for use by the public.
By these tests petitioner clearly has the status of a common
carrier by water and under the classification of the Act is,
consequently, subject to regulation under the statute. The
dissent, however, insists that the Express Cases, supra, up-
hold petitioners arguments. Upon examination it is evident
that these cases should not control. First, they are concerned
with the common law exceptions; this is, statutory material
which takes precedence. Second, they are confined to railroads
which have nothing comparable to the private carrier by
water, the bailee for hire or "tramp." Again the carriers in
specific instances were acting outside the scope of their nor-
mal duties in carrying cargo of extraordinary nature; no
question was raised concerning discrimination against the
shipping public. At no time do these cases suggest that a
common carrier by water generally of all commodities in the
trade may regularly transport on a contract basis a particular
commodity which constitutes a material part of its business.
The dissent continues with the argument that Congress did not
intend to eliminate the privilege of contract carriage. This
overlooks the fact that at common law only a bailee for hire
or "tramp" had this privilege, a class of carrier which Con-
gress specifically excepted from regulation under the statute.
Certainly Congress in providing a comprehensive regulatory
scheme for water commerce did not intend that a common
carrier might exempt itself from regulation by its own fiat,
merely by claiming that it had not expressly held itself out
538 [Vol. is
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as a common carrier of a particular commodity, especially
when express holding out was not required at common law.
Lastly, the dissent urges that the special handling problems
of bananas should allow petitioner to carry on a contract basis.
The statute is silent here, but it does provide that the Federal
Maritime Board shall be empowered to make findings as to
the unjust or unfair nature of the discrimination. As the
majority points out, this provision should give petitioner suf-
ficient protection on this question since the board has suffi-
ciently broad power to determine whether petitioners' actions
were justified under the circumstances.
EDWARD C. ROBERTS.
CONTRACTS - Statute of Frauds - Insufficiency of
Written Agreement Authorizing Broker to Sell Real Estate
Where No Statement of Commission to Be Paid is In-
cluded. - Plaintiffs, real estate brokers, obtained buyers
for defendants' realty in accordance with the terms embodied
in a binder signed by defendants. There was no statement
in the binder of the commission to be paid (a blank space
provided for this purpose was unfilled) but plaintiffs later
inserted a notation therein at the time of the sale. Defendants
refused to consummate the sale, and plaintiffs sued for the
commission allegedly due. The trial court judge, sitting with-
out a jury, rendered judgment for plaintiffs. On appeal,
HELD: Reversed. A written agreement authorizing a broker
to sell real estate for a commission which does not contain a
statement as to the amount of commission to be paid is insuffi-
cient under N. M. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-43 (Comp. 1953), a
general statute which requires brokers' employment contracts
to be written. Carney v. McGinnis, 358 P. 2d 694 (N. M.
1961).
At common law, absent statutes to the contrary, a parol
contract for the payment of a commission to a broker for the
sale of realty is valid. Henning v. Hill, 80 Ind. App. 363, 141
N. E. 66 (1923) ; Fisher v. Bell, 91 Ind. 243 (1883). The gen-
eral Statute of Frauds, requiring contracts for the sale of
lands or interests in them to be in writing, is generally con-
sidered not to apply to employment contracts of brokers unless
the compensation involves a conveyance of realty or interests
therein. Palmer v. Wadsworth, 264 Mass. 18, 161 N. E. 621
1961]
7
et al.: CASE NOTES
Published by Scholar Commons, 1961
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
(1928) ; Hancock v. Dodge, 85 Miss. 228, 37 So. 711 (1905).
This is also the view in South Carolina. Carter v. McCall,
193 S. C. 456, 8 S. E. 2d 844 (1940) ; Jumper v. Dorchester
Lumber Co., 119 S. C. 171, 111 S. E. 881 (1922). However,
in many jurisdictions, statutes upheld as a justifiable exer-
cise of the state's police power and as an exemption and en-
largement of the statute of frauds have been enacted requir-
ing these contracts to be evidenced by a written instrument
or memorandum. Harris v. Dunn, 55 N. M. 434, 234 P. 2d
821 (1951); Hale v. Kriesel, 194 Wis. 271, 215 N. W. 227
(1927). The sufficiency of the writing depends, to a great
extent, upon the particular provisions of the various statutes,
but most states agree that there must be some mention of
the names of the parties, Watson v. Brazelton, 176 S. W. 2d
216 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943); a description of the property,
Lee v. Casselman, 29 Wash. 2d 47, 185 P. 2d 107 (1947) ; the
authority of the broker, Herring v. Fisher, 110 Cal. App. 2d
322, 242 P. 2d 963 (1952); a promise to pay commissions,
Garvey v. Wenzel, 272 Wis. 606, 76 N. W. 2d 291 (1956);
and the amount of compensation to be received by the broker.
VerMass v. Culbertson, Roe, & Bell, Inc., 154 Neb. 528, 48
N. W. 2d 674 (1951), There is a considerable divergence of
opinion as to the sufficiency of the statement with respect
to the compensation to be paid, but, generally, the writing is
sufficient where the amount of compensation can be definitely
ascertained from its terms without resort to parol evidence.
Hueth v. Stevenson, 100 N. J. L. 1, 124 Atl. 773 (1924) ; Bu-
ratti v. Tennant, 147 Tex. 536, 218 S. W. 2d 842 (1949) ; where
the writing refers to some extrinsic fact or another writing
by means of which the compensation can be ascertained with
sufficient certainty, Jacobs v. Joseph E. Copp Co., 123 Ohio
St. 146, 174 N. E. 353 (1930) ; Graham v. Guetzkow, 177 Wis.
259, 187 N. W. 982 (1922); where the writing provides the
mode of ascertaining the compensation, or a basis on which
the compensation can be definitely computed, Mikkelson v.
Faber, 195 Wis. 64, 217 N. W. 702 (1928) ; Gifford v. Straub,
172 Wis. 396, 179 N. W. 600 (1920); where only a mathe-
matical computation is necessary to determine the amount of
compensation, Fisk v. Henarie, 13 Ore. 156, 9 Pac. 322 (1886) ;
Realty Mart Corp. v. Standring, 165"Wash. 21, 4 P. 2d 1101
(1931) ; and where the writing imports a promise to pay com-
pensation and provides a means for ascertaining the amount
thereof without destroying its character as a written instru-
[Vol. 13
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ment. Stockberger v. Zane, 73 Ind. App. 4, 125 N. E. 65
(1919); Lawson v. Holloman, 238 S. W. 2d 987 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1951). In California, it is held that there need be no
statement of the rate of commission payable as long as the
fact of employment is expressed, and parol evidence is ad-
missible to ascertain the compensation. Caminetti v. National
Guar. Life Co., 56 Cal. App. 2d 92, 132 P. 2d 318 (1942) ;
Toomy v. Dunphy, 86 Cal. 639, 25 Pac. 130 (1890). However,
the decided weight of authority is that there must be some
statement of the amount of compensation to be paid or the
writing is insufficient. Stone v. Bradshaw, 64 Idaho 152, 128
P. 2d 844 (1942) ; Case v. Ralph, 56 Utah 243, 188 Pac. 640
(1920). This is especially true where a blank space in the
instrument for the amount or percentage of commission is
not filled. Vogel v. Ensor, 76 Ind. App. 91, 131 N. E. 416
(1921); B/k v. Milliken, 143 Wash. 204, 255 Pac. 101
(1927).
While it is true that the passage of the New Mexico statute
was a valid exercise of the state's police power, it does not
necessarily follow that the court's construction is truly rep-
resentative of the legislature's intent at the time of the pass-
age of the act. The most frequent reason given for such legis-
lation is that the sale of realty by brokers for a commission
is a "prolific source of litigation founded upon fraud and per-
jury." The statute was, accordingly, designed to prevent
brokers from claiming commissions on transactions they never
had been authorized to make. Many of the states which re-
quire brokers employment contracts to be written also ex-
pressly provide that a statement of the commission to be
paid must be included in -the writing or memorandum. This
is not the case here, for the statute is quite general in its
terms. If the New Mexico legislature had intended that the
compensation be set out in the writing, it is probable that
they would also have enacted such a provision as other juris-
dictions have. This decision is an example of judicial legis-
lation in the face of a pre-existing, adequate legal remedy.
As long as the authority to sell is in writing, there is no possi-
bility for the mischief the legislation was designed to remedy,
and the only question would be the value of the broker's serv-
ices. It is well settled that where work is done under an
express contract which contains no statement of compensation,
the law implies a promise to pay what the service is reason-
ably worth, and the court will so construe the instrument. It
9
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would seem that the New Mexico court has interpreted the
statute too broadly - it is in derogation of the common law
and should be construed strictly - and has rendered it un-
necessarily restrictive. The California opinion appears to
be the better view when there has been an oral agreement
for compensation. Otherwise, the courts should resort to
the common law rule of settling a reasonable compensation.
DONALD 0. CLARK.
CRIMINAL LAW - Disorderly Persons - Persons Re-
quired by Statute to Relinquish Telephone Line in an Emer-
gency. - The defendant was convicted in municipal court
of being a disorderly person in that she failed to relinquish
a telephone party line to a doctor in an alleged emergency,
such action being in violation of New Jersey Statutes, §
2A :170-25.5 (Supp. 1959), which provides: "Any person who
fails to relinquish a telephone party line . . . after he has
been requested so to do to permit another to place a call,
in an emergency in which property or human life are in
jeopardy and the prompt summoning of aid is essential, to a
fire or police department or for medical aid or ambulance
service ... shall be a disorderly person; provided such party
line at the time of the request is not being used for any other
such emergency call." The defendant appealed on the ground
that the state failed to establish the emergency as required by
the statute. HELD: Affirmed. The doctor's testimony and
the steps taken by the hospital upon the patient's arrival were
consistent with the finding that an emergency existed. State
v. Zelinski, 166 A. 2d 383 (N. J. 1960).
To fully understand the law applicable to telephones one
must consider the law applicable to telegraph companies as
well, since for purposes of the law the two instruments may
be considered of the same class or type. Northwestern Tel.
Exch. Co. v. Chicago, Minn. & St. P. Ry., 76 Minn. 334, 79
N. W. 315 (1899) ; Attorney General v. The Edison Tel. Co.,
L. R. 6 Q. B. 244 (1880). Generally telegraph and telephone
companies are considered common carriers, Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Eubanks, 100 Ky. 591, 38 S. W. 1068 (1897);
Reaves v. Western Union Tel. Co., 110 S. C. 233, 96 S. E. 295
(1918), a~d are required to serve the general public without
discrimination. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hill, 163 Ala. 18,
542 [Vol. 13
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50 So. 248 (1909) ; Clemens v. Western Union Tel. Co., 42 Del.
138, 28 A. 2d 889 (1942). However, it was recognized in Eng-
land at an early date that certain types of messages, particu-
larly those having to do with matters of state, were to have
priority over routine messages. The Telegraph Act, 1863, 26
& 27 Vict. c. 112, § 48. This doctrine was adopted by the
United States, 25 Stat. 385 (1888), 47 U. S. C., § 15 (1952),
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R., 195 U. S. 540,
49 L. Ed. 312 (1904), and later by numerous states, many of
whom applied this doctrine to messages of an emergency
nature. CAL. CIvIL CODE § 2207; OKLA. REV. STAT. § 9317
(1931). Twenty-nine states have recently adopted statutes
providing that persons failing to relinquish a telephone party
line in a declared emergency shall either be disorderly persons,
N. J. REV. STAT. 2a:170-25.5 (Supp. 1959), or shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor. N. Y. CONSOL. LAWS § 1424-A (McKinney
Supp. 1960) ; VA. CODE § 18.1-368 (1950). Regarding the duty
owed by a telephone company to its subscribers, a telephone
company has been held liable for a failure of its service in
an emergency due to negligence of intentional misconduct
where the telephone company was aware that an emergency
existed, and where the resultant damages might reasonably
have been expected to follow as the natural and probable con-
sequences of the act. Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Allen,
146 S. W. 1066 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); Vinson v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 188 Ala. 292, 66 So. 100 (1914). In a
majority of cases recovery has been denied where the tele-
phone company had no notice that an injury would result
from a negligent or intentional failure of its service. Southern
Tel. Co. v. King, 103 Ark. 160, 146 S. W. 489 (1912) ; McFar-
lin v. Gulf States Tel. Co., 257 S. W. 298 (Tex. Civ. App.
1923). Likewise, recovery from a telephone company for the
loss of property by fire due to a failure of the company's
service has been consistently denied. Such action having been
held not to have proximately caused the damage. Volquardsen
v. Iowa Tel. Co., 148 Iowa 77, 126 N. W. 928 (1910) ; Forgey
v. Macon Tel. Co., 291 Mo. 539, 237 S. W. 792 (1922). In the
latter part of the nineteenth century, many states passed stat-
utes making it a criminal offense to cut or tamper with the
wires or poles of any telegraph or telephone company. CODE
OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 58-316 (1952); N. C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-154 (1951). Under this statute, a railroad company
that wilfully cut certain telephone lines, thus preventing the
1961]
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plaintiff from securing the services of a physician to attend
his wife in childbirth, was held liable for her death in an
action in tort. Hodges v. Virginia-Carolina R. R., 179 N. C.
560, 103 S. E. 145 (1920). While violation of a statute is
negligence per se, many courts have required that there be
a causal connection between the unlawful act and the injury
before recovery will be allowed. Harris v. Hughes, 266 S. W.
2d 763 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954) ; Aldridge v. Hasty, 240 N. C. 353,
82 S. E. 2d 331 (1954).
In examining the sufficiency of the State's evidence in the
present case, which is one of first impression in the United
States, the Court indicated that it would be liberal in de-
termining the existence of an emergency where the person
attempting to summon aid believed that an emergency existed.
The Court stated that "the purpose of the statute is to save
human lives not to gamble with them." This indication of
liberality may be construed as judicial approval of the legis-
lative act. Although the statute is penal in nature, it gives
rise to the interesting question of what will be the effect of
such a statute in a civil action for injuries resulting from a
failure to relinquish the line in an emergency. There being
no litigation in this area, we might examine the analogous
cases where the action was brought against the telephone
companies for a failure of service. Here the existence of a
duty was established by reason of the high degree of care a
common carrier owes to its subscribers. In an action against
a third party in a jurisdiction without such a statute the plain-
tiff, in addition to proving proximate cause, would have the
burden of establishing a duty owed the plaintiff by the third
party. Further, it can be seen from the cases against the
telephone company that the tendency has been to deny recov-
ery on the ground that the resulting injuries were too remote.
By violating the statute, however, one becomes a wrongdoer
and may be civilly liable for any consequences that proxi-
mately result from his unlawful act, whether or not he could
anticipate or foresee the result. The statute also imposes a
duty on the defendant to act and establishes a standard of
care to which he may be held in an action in tort. A civil
action brought under the statute would be similar to the case
of Hodges v. Virginia-Carolina R. R., supra, and presumably
the same result would be reached. It must be kept in mind,
however, that recovery in a civil action may be denied for a
mere violation of a penal statute, unless there is a casual re-
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lation between the violation and the injury. Regardless of
the result of any civil action that might arise, legislation of
this type is a praiseworthy example of the legislature's at-
tempt to safeguard life and property through affirmative
action. It is urged that states not having a statute of this
type adopt such legislation.
COLDEN R. BATTEY, JR.
EVIDENCE- Hearsay- Newspaper Article Admissible.
- The clock tower on plaintiff's courthouse collapsed and tele-
scoped into the courtroom. No one was injured, but the
damage exceeded $100,000. Because of charred timber found
in the debris and testimony of several residents that they had
seen a bolt of lightning strike the courthouse five days earlier,
plaintiff's investigator concluded that lightning struck the
tower causing it to collapse. Plaintiff carried fire and light-
ning insurance with defendant. Defendant's investigators and
engineers found that the tower collapsed of its own weight,
that lightning could not have caused the collapse, and that
the charred timbers were the result of a fire in the tower
which occurred many years before the date lightning sup-
posedly struck. The trial court allowed defendant to introduce
into evidence an article in a fifty-eight year old newspaper
to the effect that a fire had occurred in the tower of the court-
house in 1901, while it was still under construction. Judg-
ment in the lower court was for defendant. On appeal, HELD:
Affirmed. The newspaper article is admissible because it
is necessary and trustworthy, relevant and material, and its
admission is within the discretion of the trial judge. Dallas
County v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 286 F. 2d 388 (5th
Cir. 1961).
Hearsay evidence is testimony or written evidence in court
of a statement made-out of court- resting upon the credibility
of the out-of-court asserter for its value. MCCORMICK, EVI-
DENCE § 225 (1954). The broad rationalization is that it is
a rule rejecting assertations which cannot be subjected to
--cross-examination. 5 WIGMO E, EVIDENCE § 1362 (3d ed.
1940). The hearsay rule clearly applies to both oral and writ-
ten evidence. Baltimore Am. Ins. Co. v. Pecos Co., 122 F. 2d
143 (10th Cir. 1941); Thornton-v. City of Birmingham, 250
Ala. 651, 35 So. 2d 545, 7 A. L. R. 2d 773 (1948). Therefore,
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it follows that the rule as it pertains to written evidence also
embraces the exceptions. 31 C. J. S. Evidence § 194 (1942).
Over the years, many exceptions have developed, but all
are based upon two principles - necessity and trustworthi-
ness. 5 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 1420-1422 (3d ed. 1940). For
hearsay evidence to be "necessary," there should be no better
evidence available; Montana Power Co. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 185 F. 2d (D. C. Cir. 1950) ; United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of America, 35 F. Supp. 820 (D. C. 1940), although
the Model Code of Evidence would permit any oral or written
statement based on personal knowledge, provided the declar-
ant is unavailable. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rules 501(3) &
503, compare UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 63(4). See, Mc-
Cormick, Law and the Future: Evidence, 51 Nw. U. L. REV.
218, 219 (1956). Hearsay is "trustworthy" where the circum-
stances are such that an accurate statement would probably
be uttered, Olender v. United States, 210 F. 2d 795 (9th Cir.
1954) ; thus giving it the "guaranty of the occasion." G. & C.
Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Pub. Co., 207 Fed. 515 (2d Cir.
1913). The United States Supreme Court has characterized
newspaper reports of stock market prices as "trustworthy"
and held them to be admissible. Virginia v. West Virginia,
238 U. S. 202, 59 L. Ed. 1272 (1915). The federal courts
have become more liberal in allowing evidence to be admitted,
and have allowed evidence where "relevant and material."
5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 43.02(3) (2d ed. 1951). Rule
forty-three has been interpreted as allowing evidence to be
admitted, rather than excluded, whenever there is doubt as
to its competency. Pfotzer v. Aqua Syss., 162 F. 2d 779, (2d
Cir. 1947). Hearsay statements in newspaper articles and
clippings have been declared inadmissible in many state
courts, Lindahl v. Supreme Ct. I. 0. F., 100 Minn. 87, 110
N. W. 358 (1907); Green v. Ashland Water Co., 101 Wis.
258, 77 N. W. 722 (1898), even though at the time they were
attempting to prove such believable reports as a person's
death. Bebbington v. California W. Ins. Co., 30 Cal. 2d 157,
180 P. 2d 673 (1947) ; State v. Adanks, 256 S. W. 768 (Mo.
1923). South Carolina has had no case involving the admissi-
bility of a hearsay statement in a newspaper, but statements
from books have been declared to be incompetent and inad-
missible. Edwards v. Union Mills, 162 S. C. 17, 159 S. E. 818
(1931). Although the United States Supreme Court admitted
newspaper reports of stock market prices as being "trust-
[Vol. 13
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worthy," Virginia v. West Virginia, supra, in most jurisdic-
tions it is necessary for such evidence to fit into one of the
specific exceptions to the hearsay rule, Camps v. New York
Transit Authority, 261 F. 2d 320 (2d Cir. 1958); such as
where an eighty year old newspaper was admitted as an
"ancient document." Trustees v. Farmers Say. Bank, 66 Ohio
L. Abs. 332, 113 N. E. 2d 409 (Ohio C. P. 1953), aff'd, 115
N. E. 2d 690 (Ohio Ct. App. 1953). One state court even up-
held the admission of a newspaper where it was objected to
as hearsay, but the truthfulness of what it purported to prove
was not denied. Pilkington v. Pilkington, 230 Mo. App. 569,
93 S. W. 2d 1068 (1936).
The United States Supreme Court having declared stock
market price lists from a newspaper as admissible evidence
of the price at that time, Virginia v. West Virginia, supra,
how can it be denied that a newspaper report of a fire is ad-
missible as evidence that a fire occurred? In a published price
list the chances of error are enormous, while the chance of
reporting a fire which did not occur is most unlikely. This
decision's only fault is its tardiness. The courts have here-
tofore barred a source of reliable information. We recognize
that newspapers often make glaring errors, but these are obvi-
ous to the most casual reader. The trial judge can easily
ascertain the reliability of the newspaper account by the
type of facts attempted to be proven. Certainly, all of our
judges know that Dewey was never President (Chicago
Tribune, Nov. 3, 1948). The newspaper in this case could
have been admissible under several specific exceptions to the
hearsay rule. It could possibly have been admitted as a "busi-
ness record"; for what is the business of a newspaper but
to record and report such events. But see Johnston v. Lutz,
253 N. Y. 124, 170 N. E. 517 (1930). It was fifty-eight years
old and could have qualified as an "ancient document." See
Trustees v. Farmers Say. Bank, supra. It was, indeed, a rec-
ord of a "personal observation." While hearsay evidence has
usually been excluded unless it would fit into one of these
specific exceptions, the court here has taken all of these ex-
ceptions and put them under the heading of "necessary and
trustworthy, relevant and material." The already recognized
exceptions fit easily into this general classification, and it
furnishes a practical yardstick by which to measure evidence
in future cases. It should not be necessary to squeeze evi-
dence into one of the hearsay exceptions when it meets the,
1961]
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general requirements prescribed by this decision. The position
taken by this court was advocated by Wigmore, and the trail
was blazed by Judge Learned Hand in G. & C. Merriam Co. v
Syndicate Pub. Co., supra, where he could not find-a specific
,exception to allow the hearsay evidence offered, he declared
Jit admissible under the "principle" of the hearsay rule. Often
:an old newspaper report of an event may be the only recorda-
lion of its happening, as in this case, and to deny this evidence
to the court is to deprive it of evidence available to the public
-at large. With little effort the court could have molded the
'newspaper article to fit into one of the exceptions, instead
Ithey have sought a general rule leaving much to the discretion
,of the trial judge. This is proper, since the trial judge is in the
best position to decide the fate of the evidence offered. Cer-
Itainly a major step has been made in the development of
tthe law of evidence. In allowing the newspaper article a new
,exception to the hearsay rule has not been established, but
the principle of all the established exceptions has now be-
come ]aw.
C. JOE ROOF.
TRADE REGULATION - Fair Trade Act - Constitu-
tionality of Permissive Contract Provision. - The plaintiff,
retailer, brought proceedings against the defendant, manu-
facturer, for declaratory judgment that the Fair Trade Act,
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59-8.1 to -8.9 (Supp. 1960), is unconsti-
tutional and invalid. Prior to reselling flashbulbs at a price
less than the specified minimum resale price, the plaintiff
\was notified by letter of the minimum resale prices. After
-receiving an adverse judgment in the lower court the retailer
'brought error to the state supreme court. Held: Affirmed.
- Acceptance of the commodities for resale with notice attached
stating the minimum resale prices is actual notice, and ac-
,ceptance with actual notice is deemed assent to the terms and
a contract is created. Standard Drug Co. v. General Elec. Co.,
:202 Va. 367, 117 S. E. 2d 289 (1960). Petition for cert. filed,
.29 U. S. L. Week 3375 (U. S. June 1, 1961) (No. 1013).
'The fair trade laws are in effect a general statement of
-policy sanctioning vertical price fixing of commodities bear-
ing the mark of the producer, although such policy runs di-
xectly counter to the policy of the anti-trust laws and the
548 [Vol. 13
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common law. General Elec. Co. v. R. H. Macy & Co., 103 N. Y.
S. 2d 440, 199 Misc. 87 (1951). The avowed purpose of such
legislation is the protection of the producer against injurious
and uneconomic practices in the distribution of articles of
standard quality, under a distinguishing trademark, brand or
tradename, and such objective is to, be effectuated by pre-
venting price cutting. Pepsodent Co. v. Krauss Co., 200 La.
959, 9 So. 2d 303 (1942) ; General Elec. Co. v. R. H. Macy &
Co., supra. The backbone of every fair trade law is the "non-
signer" clause, by which an individual not a party to a price-
fixing contract may be bound by its terms. Tichenor Anti-
septic Co. v. Schwegmann, 231 La. 51, 90 So; 2d 343 (1956) ;
Rogers-Kent, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., -231 S. C. 636, 99 S. E.
2d 665 (1957). The U. S. Supreme Court in 1911 ruled that
all resale price maintenance agreements in interstate com-
merce were violative of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, such a
contract amounting to an unlawful restraint of trade. Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Parks & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373,
55 L. Ed. 502 (1911). In 1936, the same Court upheld an
Illinois statute authorizing resale price maintenance agree-
ments as an appropriate means for protecting the good will
attached to producers' trademarks. In holding that the "non-
signer" clause did not violate the due process clause of the
U. S. Constitution, the Court reasoned that the retailers had
not been unlawfully deprived of the right to dispose of their
property at their own price since, "under an implied consent
theory they were said to have acquired the product impressed
with a restriction running with it." Old Dearborn Distrib. Co.
v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 229 U. S. 183, 81 L. Ed. 109
(1939). The Miller-Tydings Act exempted fair trade legisla-
tion from the previous prohibitions of the Sherman Act. 50
Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1958). In Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384, 95 L. Ed. 1035
(1951), it was held that the Miller-Tydings Act applied only
to cases where the parties had entered into contracts made
under state fair trade laws, and in so holding the court ex-
posed the controversial "non-signer" clause to the statutory
prohibitions on restraint of trade. In an effort to obliviate
the effect of the ruling in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Dis-
tillers Corp., supra, the McGuire Act was passed. This act
legalizes state "non-signer" provisions in interstate commerce
where such provisions are valid components of the state fair
trade law. 66 Stat. 631 (1952), 15 U. S. C. § 45 (1958). The
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McGuire Act was held constitutional in 1953, and the court
said that until the U. S. Supreme Court ruled otherwise its
ruling in Old Dearborn would prevail. Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Mkts., 205 F. 2d 788 (5th Cir.
1953). With Fair Trade Acts presently secure at the federal
level, the opponents of fair trade have had their greatest
success in attacking the legislation in the state courts on state
constitutional grounds. Nearly all of the states have Fair
Trade Acts, and the majority of those tested and sustained
have been upheld on virtually the same ground as presented in
Old Dearborn. Max Factor v. Kunsman, 5 Cal. 2d 466, 55 P.
2d 177 (1936) ; Bourgois Sale Co. v. Dorfman, 273 N. Y. 167,
7 N. E. 2d 30 (1937) ; 34 ORE. L. REV. 128 (1955). The rest
of the state supreme courts, in what has been regarded as a
trend, have struck down the statutes as violative of the re-
spective state constitutions and, in doing so, have rejected
the arguments and reasoning of the Old Dearborn decision.
The specific grounds for declaring the provisions unconsti-
tutional have varied, but the theories most often adopted are:
1) Violation of due process of law. Cox v. General Elec. Co.,
211 Ga. 286, 85 S. E. 2d 514 (1955); Rogers-Kent, Inc. v.
General Elec. Co., supra. 2) Denial of equal protection of the
laws. McGraw Elec. Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 195 Neb.
703, 68 N. W. 2d 608 (1955) ; and 3) Unlawful delegation of
legislative power. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp v. Francis, 134
Colo. 160, 301 P. 2d 139 (1956) ; Quality Oil Co. v. E. L duPont
de Nemours & Co., 182 Kan. 488, 322 P. 2d 731 (1958). In
1956, Virginia ruled that its Fair Trade Act, VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 59-1 to -8 (Supp. 1960), was in conflict with subsequently
amended sections of the Anti-Monopoly Act, VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 59-20 to -40 (Supp. 1960), and had been repealed by impli-
cation, and thus did not determine the constitutionality of the
"non-signer" provision. Benrus Watch Co. v. Kuisch, 198 Va.
94, 92 S. E. 2d 384 (1956). The General Assembly of Vir-
ginia re-enacted the Fair Trade Act in 1958, substituting for
the "non-signer" clause a permissive contractual provision
that permits the voluntary contractual restriction on minimum
resale price to be agreed upon by the manufacturer or distrib-
utor and retailer. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59-8.1 to -8.9 (Supp.
1960).
By elimination of the controversial "non-signer" clause and
substituting for it a permissive contract provision, Virginia
has removed the chief ground and reason relied upon by
[Vol. 13
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courts that have held Fair Trade Acts to be unconstitutional.
The agreement between the manufacturer or distributor and
retailer restricting the sale of trademarked goods at less than
a specified minimum price is limited to voluntary agreements.
As stated by the court in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distill-
ers Corp., supra, "[c]ontracts or agreements convey the idea
of a cooperative arrangement, not a program whereby recalci-
trants are dragged in by the heels and compelled to submit
to price fixing." Questions may arise as to whether the agree-
ment actually constitutes a "contract" or is merely a stipula-
tion by the seller made a "contract" by legislative fiat
regardless of assent by the buyer. Under the act acceptance
of the commodities for resale with notice attached stating
the minimum resale prices is actual notice, and acceptance
with actual notice is deemed assent to the terms and a con-
tract is formed. An analogous situation is found in the resale
of patented goods. The decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court
have firmly established that a patentee cannot, by virtue of his
statutory monopoly, impose, by notice accompanying the goods,
a restriction as to the resale price which would accompany
them into the hands of subsequent purchasers. United States
v. General Elec. Co., 272 U. S. 476, 71 L. Ed. 362 (1926);
Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U. S. 436, 84 L. Ed.
852 (1940).
Although the present Virginia act eliminates the "non-
signer" clause, this factor alone is not sufficient to uphold
the constitutionality of the Fair Trade Act, especially where
the courts do not recognize a need for them. The courts will
still have to accept and rely to a large extent upon the reason-
ing of Old Dearborn, as Virginia did in this case. The present
trend is to regard Fair Trade Acts as price fixing statutes,
whereas in Old Dearborn the court said that the primary aim
is to protect the property, namely, the goodwill, of the pro-
ducer and that the price restrictions were adopted as an ap-
propriate means to that legitimate end, not as an end in itself.
In Rogers-Kent v. General Elec. Co., supra, the South Carolina
Supreme Court held its Fair Trade Act unconstitutional as it
applied to "non-signers." In its decision the Court said that
the Fair Trade Act can be justified only upon the theory that
it is a proper exercise of the police power of the state which
can only be exercised where it is reasonably necessary in the
interest of the public safety, health, and general welfare, and
that it was difficult to find justification for this legislation
1961]
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upon these considerations since the act applies to trade marked
products on which no distinction is made between commodi-
ties affected with a public interest and those that are not.
Therefore, even though the act eliminates the controversial
"non-signer" clause, the constitutionality of Fair Trade Acts
patterned after the present Virginia act will seemingly de-
pend to some extent upon acceptance or rejection of the rea-
soning in Old Dearborn, and the courts' views as to the need
for such statutes.
DALTON FLOYD, JR.
TRESPASS - Infants - Can A Nine-Year-Old Child
Form The Necessary Intent in an Action of Trespass? -
Plaintiff brought an action of trespass against a nine-year-old
defendant who admittedly swam to the bottom of plaintiff's
public swimming pool, raised a metal cover over a drain
opening, inserted a tennis ball into the pipe, and replaced
the cover. The ball was sucked into a critical part of the
pipe and caused substantial damage. The lower court judge
in his instructions to the jury stated that in determining
whether or not the defendant was a trespasser the jury should
consider whether the nature of the act is such that children
of like age would realize its injurious consequences. On ap-
peal, HELD: Reversed. The child's act was clearly intentional
and this issue should not have been submitted to the jury
at all. Cleveland v. Periy, 165 A. 2d 485 (D. C. Mun. App.
1960).
The broad common law principle regarding an action ex
delicto is absolute liability regardless of the age of the infant.
Sikes v. Johnson, 16 Mass. 389 (1820), 27 Am. JuR. Infants
§§ 90, 91 (1940). However, the age of an infant in an action
of negligence does play a substantial part in determining
his liability, since a child of tender years is not required to
conform to the standard of behavior which it is reasonable
to expect of an adult; but his conduct is to be judged by the
standard to be expected from a child of like age, intelligence,
and experience under similar circumstances. Charbonneau v.
MacRury, 84 N. H. 501, 153 Atl. 457 (1931). Another excep-
tion seems to be where the infant is incapable of forming the
necessary mental attitudes which are required elements of
the tort in question. For example, the necessary ingredients
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of libel and slander are malice and evil intent, therefore a
child of such immature and tender years that he cannot
form malice or entertain conscious evil intention cannot be
guilty of either libel or slander. Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo.
App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076 (1911). As to intentional torts, the
courts appear to be in agreement that in so far as a young
child can form the intention to do the physical act releasing
the harmful force, he can be held liable. Ellis v. D'A:gclo,
116 Cal. App. 2d 310, 253 P. 2d 675 (1953). An action of
trespass is regarded as an intentional tort; therefore, it is
not essential that the defendant act designedly if the injury
is the immediate result of the force applied by him and the
plaintiff is damaged by this force. Newson v. Anderso), 24
N. C. 42, 37 Am. Dec. 406 (1941). A lunatic is held account-
able in a civil action for any tort he may commit, on the
development of the principle that in trespass the intent is
not conclusive. McIntyre v. Shorlty, 121 Ill. 660, 13 N. E.
239 (1887). In an intentional tort the defendant may be
liable although he has meant nothing more than a good-
natured practical joke. Reynold v. Pierson, 29 Ind. App. 273,
64 N. E. 484 (1902). Even where he is seeking the plaintiff's
own good, liability may result. Johnson v. McCommel, 15
Hun 293 (N. Y. 1878). In a personal injuries action the
intent to harm need not be established, and the absence of
it does not absolve a six-year-old defendant so long as the
act was done with intent to inflict an offensive bodily contact.
Baldenger v. Banks, 201 N. Y. S. 2d 629 (App. Div. 2d (1960).
The intent of a five-year-old child to cause harm is immaterial
in determining his liability under a trespass action. Seaburg
v. Williams, 16 Ill. App. 2d 295, 148 N. E. 2d 49 (1958).
The instant case is certainly no variation of the general rule
which has stood the test of time and seems deeply embedded
in the common law. It is contended by those who appear to
be in a minority that the mentality required of an infant in
a wilful tort of the trespass type should conform to that re-
quired in negligent torts. A distinction is evident. A child
of tender age may be without sufficient mentality to foresee
that his careless conduct might result in injury to others, but
it can certainly be expected that a nine-year-old child is capa-
ble of intending to do his positive acts, which is the only
intent necessary in an action of trespass. Therefore, it seems
consistent to hold that the child who is incapable of negligence
is at the same time capable of intending to commit a positive
19611
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act which is wrongful in itself. It cannot be correctly stated
that the courts in allowing recovery have completely elimi-
nated the age factor. It is still conclusive if there is proof
that the infant is incapable of intending to do his positive
acts; going further would be recognizing the ancient theories
of liability without fault. The results of such decisions, as
rendered by this court, should have the effect of parents main-
taining a closer watch over their children thereby reducing
the risk of such injuries occurring.
WmLiAM HAGOOD.
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